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Weather is a major limiting factor in the National Airspace System (NAS) today, accounting for roughly 65% of all 
traffic delays. Because we cannot control weather and safety must be maintained in the presence of weather- related 
hazards, our ability to mitigate the effects of weather through advances in weather prediction, human factors, 
decision support tools, automation and display technology are critical to supporting the projected growth in air travel 
demand. This paper presents the core ideas, human factors approach, and initial display concepts for supporting all-





Weather is a major limiting factor in the NAS today, 
accounting for roughly 65% of all traffic delays. 
Because we cannot control the weather and because 
safety must be maintained in the presence of weather 
related hazards, our ability to predict the weather and 
how it influences air traffic are critical elements in 
designing the future NAS.  As part of NASA’s Virtual 
Airspace Modeling and Simulation (VAMS) project we 
have been developing concepts for mitigating weather 
effects, and thus restoring or increasing the NAS 
capacity, for the years 2020 and beyond. 
 
The capacity of the NAS is ultimately limited by its 
ability to accommodate safe and efficient travel under 
all weather conditions.  The key to greater capacity in 
the NAS lies in our ability to accurately predict and 
adjust the future state of the NAS on a timescale 
consistent with critical NAS response times.  From a 
Human Factors perspective we have developed a 
triad of core ideas to represent our concept for 
increasing the NAS capacity in the context of 
weather.  The core ideas are: 1) flexible traffic 
management, 2) shared situation awareness, and 3) 
coupled weather and traffic prediction. The “Core 
Idea Triad” is based on the philosophy that the 
optimal plans, strategies and responses for mitigating 
weather effects cannot be fully achieved without 
common situation awareness among different NAS 
users, coordination of traffic plans, and sufficient 
information sharing and transfer.   
 
We have developed a set of scenarios that depict both 
current day and future concept operations in the 
context of capacity-limiting weather events, across 
different levels of scope (e.g., local weather events, 
ground vs. upper air weather, propagating weather 
events) and involving different sets of NAS users 
(pilots, ATC, traffic managers, dispatchers, etc.). 
Each scenario details the weather phenomena in 
question, how the weather impacts current-day 
operations, future roles and responsibilities, decision 
support tools (DSTs) and other user interfaces 
derived from our core ideas and concepts.  Further, 
for each scenario we have developed a preliminary 
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set of functional illustrations, which serve to 
demonstrate the information that a given user, or set 
of users, might have access to in the future NAS. 
 
A Human Factors Approach 
 
A major element of this project was the identification 
of key human performance objectives, listed below. 
Our belief is that these issues underlie many of the 
previous failed attempts to introduce automation and 
decision aiding to the NAS at a large scale. 
• Improve the Distribution of Data and 
Provide Tools to Assist with its Use.   
• Make Technologies Useful in Spite of their 
Brittleness   
• Constrain the Solutions Suggested by a DST 
Based on Human Factors Considerations. 
• Support Collaboration and Coordination 
among distributed NAS operators.   
 
A Human-Centered Design Process 
 
As part of the concept design process, we first 
developed a high-level human-centered design 
approach.  This approach is represented by the 
following main human factors themes. 
• Implement new technology to enhance 
performance while employing human-
centered design techniques to support 
human decision making, keep operators in 
the loop and in control. 
• Utilize communication and display 
technologies to share relevant information 
and perspectives between pilots, dispatchers, 
controllers and traffic managers. 
• Help formalize and automate useful 
procedures carried out today in a manual, 
effortful and ad-hoc manner. 
• Maintain current roles and responsibilities as 
much as possible, but support proactive 
problem solving through advanced 
technology, human-centered DSTs and 
shared awareness interfaces. 
• Develop realistic solutions that can 
implemented in the near-term or in phases 
over time. 
• Design distributed work systems and 
procedures in order to avoid excessive 
cognitive complexity and workload for any 
one individual. 
Our User Interface Approach 
 
Our approach to user interface design, which we intend 
to apply to all operators within the NAS, is to impact 
the user's ability to access, understand, integrate, and 
act on the variety of information sources, and to do so 
in support of both individual and group work, in a 
timely fashion and with undue levels of workload and 
stress.  New and emerging sensor, algorithm and 
display technologies will be considered in our effort.  
Finally, our interface design approach is supported by 
the following design principles. 
• Shared awareness – push relevant and 
context-sensitive, though not identical 
representations of, information to various 
NAS users towards facilitating collaborative 
decision making. 
• User control/authority—support user, don’t 
make decision for them. 
• Transparency – allow the user access to the 
logic behind any calculation, algorithm or 
decision support solutions. 
• Multi-modal – provide users with multiple 
information views or perspectives, taking 
advantage of different input and processing 
modalities. 
• Collaborative – provide interfaces that make 
collaboration between NAS users efficient, 
easy and beneficial. 
• Flexible – prevent automation and 
technology brittleness by allow the user to 
choose the parameters, to alter the logic, to 
add constraints not considered by the DST, 
to override automatically created values, and 
to adjust levels of uncertainty. 
• Present Wx implications, not just data – 
provide the user with the implications or the 
effects of Wx, not just the data. In doing so, 
the interface is performing a common 
cognitive task for the human, that is, 
determining how Wx conditions will affect 
aircraft performance, airport surfaces, and 
other safety variables. 
• Saliency – provide salient, at-a-glance 
indicators of overload, capacity loss, 
uncertainty, predicted effectiveness. 
• Modeling and comparisons- provide the user 
with tools to model and compare various DST 
solutions, before selecting a specific initiative. 
• User defined constraints – allow users to 
define and input constraints that may not be 
known to the computer system. 
• Input of user priorities – allow timely and easy 
input and adjustment of user priorities. 
• Visual modeling– provide layered visual 
representations of solutions, effects and Wx so 
that the user can easily see how the proposed 
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initiative will mitigate Wx and other 
constraints. 
• History-provide the user with access to 
historical data (e.g., delayed or pop-up flights), 
success rates and system-derived estimates of 
the applicability of a DST solution to a given 
context or situation. 
Concept Interfaces 
 
On the following page we present some of the 
concept interfaces developed as part of this effort.  
They are already making a large impact on the 
aviation community and future plan for mitigating 
weather effects on our national airspace system. 
 
 
Future Ground Control SA Interface Showing Wx Effects 
 
Future Ground Control SA Interface Showing Pilot View 
 
 
Future Traffic Manager Interface Showing Plan Comparison 
 




Future Center Controller Interface Showing DST Logic 
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An evaluation of Boeing 737 line pilot performance of memory items in 5 abnormal checklists was performed in a 
single-blind experiment using tabletop exercises at the crew base of a major U.S. airline. A study of 16 pilots shows 
that performance of memory items results in errors in identifying the failure, selecting the proper checklist to be 




Some system failures that can occur on commercial 
airliners require flight crews to perform checklist steps 
from memory prior to referring to the checklist. These 
steps, called memory items or recall steps, are for time 
critical actions crucial to the safe continuation of the 
flight (e.g., preventing severe aircraft damage or crew 
incapacitation). Typically, line pilots do not study 
memory items except in preparation for a proficiency 
check (PC), usually every 6 or 12 months. They arrive 
for their evaluation prepared to be tested on the recall 
of the memory items. Their performance in these 
evaluations may not reflect their performance on the 
line, months after a PC. 
 
This study examines whether line pilots are familiar 
enough with the memory items to perform all of them 
reliably, without prior knowledge that they will be 
evaluated. It was predicted that the performance of the 
memory items would show errors of commission, 
omission, and order due to the pilots’ infrequent 
review of the memory items. This impromptu method 
of evaluation more closely resembles an unanticipated 
inflight emergency. This paper reviews some of the 
literature on performance under stress and then 
discusses the results pertaining to errors in 
identification of failures and errors in checklist 
selection. Although checklist step omission and order 
errors were observed, this paper will focus on the 
commission errors in the completion of checklist steps. 
 
Human Performance Under Stress 
 
An inflight emergency requiring timely action imposes 
a great deal of stress on the flight crew. Previous studies 
have shown that recall under high-stress conditions is 
more prone to errors than recall under low-stress 
conditions [8]. These errors, as they relate to checklist 
use, may include errors in identifying the abnormal 
condition, selecting the correct checklist, and errors of 
commission (adding steps or performing steps 
incorrectly), omission (missing steps), or order 
(completing steps in the wrong sequence). 
 
Baddeley [1] presented a review of studies that included 
performance of deep-sea divers, combat aviators in 
actual combat, soldiers in simulated emergencies, and 
skydivers. These studies evaluated the performance of 
manual dexterity tasks, tracking tasks, and attention to 
peripheral cues. They showed that danger manifests 
itself in human performance through a narrowing of 
attention or through an increase in time to complete a 
manual dexterity task. The narrowing of attention can 
potentially lead to increased performance only if the 
task being performed is understood to be important. 
However, performance on tasks made to seem 
peripheral during an emergency can deteriorate [3]. 
Similarly, if the task is so complex as to require 
attention to numerous cues, the narrowing of attention 
will result in an inability to integrate relevant task 
information and an inability to conduct a proper 
assessment of the situation [6]. 
 
It is possible that training can mitigate some of these 
effects. However, even though pilots receive regular 
training in emergency procedures in simulators, that 
does not mean they are unaffected by the stress of an 
actual emergency. An emergency in a simulator is not 
perceived as life-threatening. If the pilot fails, the 
simulator can be reset for another attempt. Unless a 
pilot has had repeated experience in dealing with a 
truly dangerous emergency, performance in a real 
emergency could be similar to a novice. It has been 
shown that subjects are able to inhibit fear and prevent 
it from affecting their performance only if they are 
repeatedly exposed to a dangerous situation [1]. Due to 
the reliability of today’s airliners, it is unlikely for the 




Stress Effects on Problem Analysis 
 
It is possible that performance on infrequent tasks, 
such as identifying the root cause of multiple failures 
or shutting down an engine inflight, is affected more 
by stress than are common tasks. This is “an effect that 
has profound implications for the design of procedures 
to be used under the stressful conditions of 
emergency” [9]. 
 
This effect can sometimes be observed when people 
continue with a planned series of actions they are 
familiar with even when the actions appear 
unsuccessful or inappropriate. By acting before 
analyzing the situation, the operator may exacerbate 
the situation, which may induce more stress, and make 
it increasingly difficult to identify the original cause of 
the failure. This is related to an effect referred to as 
confirmation bias, where a person attends to cues that 
support a belief, and discounts cues that contradict the 
belief. Confirmation bias has been demonstrated in the 
use of automation and even in the diagnosis of 
everyday situations [4, 5, 7]. Other studies have shown 
that under stress, subjects are less effective and more 
disorganized at considering alternative solutions and 
incorporate less data in decision-making [6]. 
 
Stress Effects on Completion of Checklist Steps 
 
Discussions with pilot participants in this study suggest 
that the requirement to perform certain actions from 
memory implies a sense of urgency in the performance 
of those actions. This introduces another potential 
source of error due to the loss of accuracy as speed is 
increased, an effect that is best described by the speed-
accuracy operating characteristic (SAOC). The SAOC 
is a function that represents the inverse relationship 
between accuracy and speed. As the performance of a 
task requires more speed, accuracy is reduced until it 
approaches chance. If accuracy is excessively 
emphasized, then the time required to complete a task 
increases greatly with little improvement in accuracy. 
 
Wickens & Hollands [9] summarize studies that 
demonstrate the effects of stress, induced by speed or 
by threat of bodily harm, on performance accuracy. 
For example, bomb-disposal experts performing under 
stress made more errors while working faster, and 
subjects who were threatened with the potential for 
electric shock gave up on problem-solving activities 
early. 
 
Using an emergency descent as an example, an earlier 
study [2] showed that crews performing an emergency 
descent from memory took longer to descend than 
crews using the checklist. The difference in descent 
time resulted from omission errors by crews 
performing memory items. They occasionally omitted 
deploying the speedbrake, causing the airplane to 
descend slower. On the other hand, crews that 
performed the procedure by reference to the checklist 
did not make these errors, but took longer to complete 
the checklist. Regardless of the time required to read 
through the checklist, the crews performing the 
procedure by reference descended to a safe altitude in 
less time because of the use of the speedbrake. 
 
The perceived requirement to perform checklist steps 
quickly from memory during high-stress situations is at 
odds with the need to perform those checklist steps 
accurately. There is a potential for loss of accuracy as 
the performance speed increases. Attempting 100% 
accuracy would require so much time to complete a 
checklist that other flying tasks would be disrupted. 
There is a tradeoff between getting the procedure done 
quickly, and getting it done while minimizing the 
possibility of error. 
 
The following methodology seeks to identify examples 
of these errors in the flight operations domain. Even 
though inducing a level of stress similar to that of a 
real emergency was not possible in this study, it was 
hypothesized that errors of commission, omission, and 






Sixteen 737 line pilots at a crew base of a major U.S. 
airline volunteered for the study. These pilots were 
already at the crew base either in preparation for a 
flight or returning from one. Participants were 
accepted without regard to experience level and 
participated in the study individually and not as a 
member of a two person crew. Pilots reported being 




In order to avoid any priming effects in the recall of 
their emergency procedures, subjects were not 
informed of the purpose of the research.  They were 
instead briefed that: 
 
 the research was on the suitability of the 737 
alerting system,  
 they would be asked to talk through five 
procedures, and  
 the results from this study may be relevant to the 
design of a new alerting system in future airplanes.  
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A brief survey of experience was collected. This 
included data on total number of hours flown, their 
time in airplane type, flying time since last PC, and 
their crew position.  
 
Subjects were seated in front of a poster of the flight 
deck. For consistency, a color poster of the 737 Classic 
flight deck was used. Five non-alerted abnormal 
procedures that contain memory items were used. They 
included aborted engine start, engine limit/surge/stall, 
rapid depressurization, runaway stabilizer trim, and 
dual engine failure. 
 
The experimenter began each scenario by describing a 
normal flight situation, and then interjecting cues that 
suggest a particular failure. Subjects were asked to 
react to the cues as they would inflight, performing any 
procedures they felt were necessary. When responses 
to the scenarios seemed vague, the researcher probed 
the participants to encourage them to elaborate. The 
participants were provided with their airline Quick 
Reference Handbook (QRH), and were allowed to 
select the checklist they felt was most appropriate for 







The participants in this study were 16 current line 
pilots at a major U.S. airline. Of those pilots, one was 
eliminated from the final analysis because he 
determined during the interview that an evaluation of 
the performance of memory items was the goal of the 
research. 
 
Table 1.  Demographics 
 
Data from the experience survey is presented in Table 
1. Nine First Officers and six Captains participated. 
Two pilots incorrectly reported their total time and 
time in type, and their numbers were excluded. Seven 
pilots had prior military experience ranging from land 
and carrier-based fighters to large transports. Pilots 
who did not have military experience came from 
various corporate jets, commuter planes, other large 
commercial airlines, and corporate turboprops. 
 
Checklist Selection Errors 
 
When pilots were given an engine start condition with no 
oil pressure indications, four pilots initially chose the 
Engine Low Oil Pressure checklist. Upon reading that 
checklist, two of those pilots realized it was not 
appropriate for the situation, and correctly selected the 
Aborted Engine Start checklist. One pilot reported that 
there was no checklist needed, and that a maintenance call 
would be the only action required after completing the 
engine shutdown. The remaining 10 pilots correctly 
referenced the Aborted Engine Start checklist (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. Aborted Engine Start Checklist Selection 
 
The Engine Limit/Surge/Stall scenario had the lowest 
identification rate (Table 3). Only two pilots 
referenced the correct checklist. One of those two 
selected the Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation 
checklist first. The remaining pilots referenced various 
checklists, including Engine Fire/Severe 




















4 6 6,614 13 
Standard 
Deviation 6,829 4 6,535 17 
Minimum 4,500 0.5 400 1 
Maximum 
25,00




Aborted Engine Start 10 
Engine Low Oil Pressure  2 






Engine Limit/Surge/Stall (Correct) 1 
Engine Fire > Engine Limit / Surge / Stall  
(Experimenter prompted the correct checklist 
by saying the engine was “surging”) 
1 
Engine Failure 6 
Engine Fire 4 
Engine Overheat > Engine Fire 1 
Engine Overheat 1 
Engine Overheat > Engine Failure 1 
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The remaining three scenarios had few checklist 
selection errors. One pilot selected the Auto 
Fail/Unscheduled Pressurization Change checklist 
during a rapid depressurization. Another pilot 
performed the Stabilizer Out Of Trim checklist in the 
runaway stabilizer scenario. 
 
Checklist Step Errors 
 
The majority of checklist step errors occurred during 
the completion of the dual engine failure memory 
items. Many of those were commission errors. These 
included: 
 
• bringing the thrust levers back to idle before 
attempting to restart the engine, 
• advancing the thrust levers as the engines failed in 
an attempt to get them to restart, 
• starting the APU to try an assisted start, 
• waiting three seconds to attempt a restart after 
shutting off the fuel, 
• placing the ignition selector to both, and 













If EGT exceeds 950°C:
Allow engines to overheat
Repeat above steps
Attempt restart one at a time
 
Figure 1. Dual Engine Failure Commission Errors. 
Bold items indicate the correct steps. Arrows indicate 
all additional steps performed by the 15 pilots. 
 
In the rapid depressurization scenario, two pilots 
included additional steps: 
 
• verifying the engine bleeds were on, and  
• closing the bleed air isolation valve (Figure 2). 
Engine bleed switches..........................On
Isolation valve...................................Close





Figure 2.  Rapid Depressurization Commission Errors. 
 
Four pilots made commission errors in the completion 
of the runaway stabilizer trim checklist by attempting 
to activate the electric trim switches in the direction 
opposite the runaway. One of those four pilots stated 
that he would also attempt to engage a different 
autopilot in the hopes that it would not experience the 
same malfunction (Figure 3). 
Control column.....................Hold firmly
Autopilot (if engaged)...........Disengage
Electric trim in opposite direction
Engage other autopilot
If runaway stabilizer continues:
Trim cutout switches...............Cutout
Trim wheel.....................Grasp & hold
 




Checklist Selection Errors 
 
When presented with cues to an abnormal situation, 
pilots sometimes omit a thorough analysis of the 
situation. This became evident through previous 
observations of pilots performing abnormal procedures 
in simulators and anecdotal evidence. The pilots in this 
study demonstrated a tendency to fixate on the most 
prominent cue and perform the checklist appropriate to 
that cue. However, a thorough analysis of the situation 
can reveal that the single most prominent cue does not 
always lead the pilot to the correct checklist. 
 
There were 23 checklist selection errors. With the 
following three exceptions, the errors appear to be 
caused by the pilots’ fixation on a single cue. 
Experimenter error in describing the rapid 
depressurization failure to one pilot gave the 
impression that the cabin altitude began to stabilize at 
approximately 12,000 feet, which led him to the Auto 
Fail/Unscheduled Pressurization Change checklist. 
Another error was due to a pilot’s belief that no 
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checklist was required for an aborted engine start. 
Finally, one pilot referred to the Dual Engine Failure 
checklist as the Engine Inflight Start checklist, but 
performed the correct memory items. 
 
The remaining 20 checklist selection errors appear to be 
caused by pilots fixating on a single cue, and performing 
the checklist that appears most related to that cue. For 
example, in the aborted engine start, the cues given to 
the pilots were the continued illumination of the LOW 
OIL PRESSURE light and no oil pressure indication. 
Four pilots stated that, given those cues, they would 
complete the Low Oil Pressure checklist. 
 
Two of those pilots realized the Low Oil Pressure 
checklist was inappropriate by considering the 
reasonableness of the checklist steps they were 
reading. The checklist directed the pilots to the Engine 
Failure/Shutdown checklist, which is meant for an 
inflight engine shutdown. A shutdown of an engine on 
the ground is simpler than a shutdown inflight and 
these pilots determined that irrelevant steps such as: 
starting the APU, maintaining fuel balance, and 
preparing for a single-engine landing, indicated they 
were in the wrong checklist. However, one pilot who 
entered the Engine Failure checklist from the Low Oil 
Pressure checklist did not consider the appropriateness 
of the checklist steps he was reading, and showed a 
tendency for perseveration. He went so far as to 
complete the Engine Failure checklist, reading aloud 
and bypassing irrelevant steps to complete the only 
step required to actually shutdown the engine while on 
the ground. 
 
In the engine limit scenario, the 14 subjects who did 
not select the correct checklist instead performed the 
checklist that most closely reflected the cue they said 
was the most important. One pilot initially selected the 
Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation checklist, but 
turned to the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall checklist only 
after the experimenter said the engine was “surging”. 
The term “surging” was not used as a cue in any other 
scenarios. Pilots who were primarily concerned by the 
abnormal “popping” or “banging” noises referenced 
the Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation checklist, 
stating that they believed the noises suggested severe 
engine damage. Pilots who considered excessive 
exhaust gas temperature (EGT) to be more important 
completed checklists related to overheat conditions. 
The pilot who referenced the Stabilizer Out Of Trim 
checklist in the runaway stabilizer scenario did so 
because he believed the STAB OUT OF TRIM light 
would be illuminated. 
 
 
Checklist Step Errors 
 
There appear to be consistent patterns in the observed 
checklist step errors. Many of the commission errors 
appear to result from the pilots’ creativity in dealing 
with an abnormal situation. It was observed that many 
pilots perform steps in addition to what was required 
based on their understanding of how the airplane 
systems functioned, even though their understanding of 
the systems may be incorrect. Some pilots explained 
that the performance of some additional steps occurs 
because of knowledge of the intricacies of a complex 
system gained over years of experience or knowledge 
of common and simple failure modes, which are not 
addressed in the checklist. This may resolve the 
situation without the need for a checklist. In other 
cases, an incorrect or incomplete understanding of the 
system may lead pilots to perform additional steps that 
delay the completion of steps necessary to resolve the 
situation, or that may exacerbate the condition. 
 
The pilots’ creativity in dealing with certain situations 
was most evident in the dual engine failure scenario, 
which had the highest number of commission errors. A 
possible explanation was apparent in the pilots’ 
response to this scenario: a desire to “do whatever it 
takes” to resolve a serious situation. Their perception 
was that this failure was so severe that they would 
exercise their authority as pilots, beyond what is 
written in the checklist, in an attempt to get an engine 
running, regardless of the consequences. Some pilots’ 
willingness to allow the engines to exceed EGT and 
overheat, contrary to the guidance in the checklist, 
demonstrated this belief. 
 
Most errors of commission were intended to 
troubleshoot the failures, such as: advance the thrust 
levers, verify the start levers are at idle, turn around to 
exit the heavy rain that caused the failure, and 
manually select both igniters. This last step 
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the ignition 
system. By correctly completing the recall item in the 
checklist, both igniters were automatically energized. 
 
When the situation called for a shutdown of both 
engines, two pilots performed the additional step of 
delaying 3 seconds between restart attempts. They 
explained that this stemmed from a folk belief carried 
over from their military background that additional 
time was needed for excess fuel to clear the engine 
before attempting a restart. 
 
This disposition towards creative troubleshooting was 
also seen in the Runaway Stabilizer Trim and Rapid 
Depressurization checklists. Errors of commission 
included moving the electric trim switches in the 
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opposite direction and engaging the other autopilot. 
One pilot reported that he had experienced a runaway 
stabilizer in the past, and activating the electric trim 
switches stopped the runaway. This is an example of a 
pilot’s knowledge of the failure modes of a complex 
system that could resolve the situation without using  
a checklist. 
 
The rapid depressurization scenario showed that some 
commission errors, such as closing the isolation valve 
and ensuring the engine bleeds are on, would not 
exacerbate the situation, but would not be beneficial 
either. They would simply delay the completion of the 
necessary steps. Moreover, the manual closing of the 
isolation valve demonstrates a lack of understanding of 
the bleed air system. This step is not required because 
the valve is already closed during its normal operation. 
 
On the other hand, some commission errors aggravated 
the situation. An example was seen in some pilots’ 
willingness to allow the engines to overheat while 
restarting after a dual engine failure. The consequence 
of the overheating could be engine damage and a true 
engine failure, instead of the original problem of a 
temporary flameout due to an environmental condition 




The results demonstrate that pilots have difficulty 
identifying the cause of the failure and selecting the 
correct procedure. After identifying the situation, 
knowledge of the appropriate memory items is such 
that pilots commit errors in recall even during 
unstressed conditions with a poster of the flight deck 
for context. 
 
None of the five failure scenarios in this study had a 
distinct indicator light that would annunciate the 
condition. Pilots were forced to analyze the cues and 
determine the appropriate procedure. This is an 
uncommon and involved task, and not performing it 
may force pilots to complete only those tasks they are 
familiar with, such as following an illuminated LOW 
OIL PRESSURE light to the Low Oil Pressure 
checklist during an aborted engine start, or fixating on 
abnormal engine noises and performing the Engine 
Fire/Severe Damage/Separation checklist, instead of 
the more appropriate Engine Limit/Surge/Stall 
checklist.  
 
The observed checklist step errors showed that pilots 
commit a number of errors. The majority of the 
commission errors were steps performed by pilots to 
resolve a failure based on their knowledge of the 
airplane systems. Some of these commission errors 
demonstrated a misunderstanding of how the systems 
in the 737 functioned. Other errors were a result of 
either knowledge gained during a real experience in 
the past, or a belief carried over from previous 





Even though the method used in this study did not 
induce stress, it allowed for an evaluation of the pilots’ 
knowledge of the memory items without prior 
preparation. Pilots generally perform well during their 
PCs, and possibly better than inflight, because they 
expect an evaluation and can prepare for it. Pilot 
performance observed in this study may be closer to 
that in an inflight emergency, in which the pilots are 
unprepared to perform their memory items. 
 
Clearly, an inflight emergency places a pilot under a 
great deal of stress. Based on the literature review, it 
can be inferred that errors similar to those observed 
here may occur inflight during an actual emergency, 
and may even occur more frequently due to increased 
stress. Conducting a similar study in a full-flight 
simulator may provide a level of stress similar to what 
is experienced in a real emergency. The results 
obtained from a simulator could be a more realistic 
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